HEADQUARTERS: Laayoune
DURATION: September 1991 to present
AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: Approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and about 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel
CURRENT STRENGTH: 237 military observers, 48 military support personnel, 49 police officers and approximately 180 international and local civilian staff members
FATALITIES: 4
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan (Pakistan)
FORCE COMMANDER: Brigadier-General Andr, Van Baelen (Belgium)
BACKGROUND
In 1985, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in cooperation with the Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, initiated a joint mission of good offices in the search for a solution of the question of Western Sahara. On 11 August 1988, the Secretary- General and the Special Envoy of the Chairman presented, in separate meetings, to the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara, namely Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacin de Saguia el-Hamra y de Ro de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), a document referred to as "the settlement proposals".
The document contained proposals for a just and definitive solution of the question of Western Sahara in conformity with 1960 General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). This would be accomplished by means of a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum without military or administrative constraints, to enable the people of Western Sahara, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco.
On 27 June 1990, the Security Council, in its resolution 658 (1990) , approved a report of the Secretary-General, which contained the full text of the settlement proposals as accepted by the two parties on 30 August 1988, as well as an outline of the
Secretary-General's plan for implementing those proposals.
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
The implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, acting under the authority of the Secretary-General, would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to the referendum, including its organization and conduct. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by a deputy special representative and by an integrated group of United Nations civilian, military and civilian police personnel. This group would be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
According to the plan, the transitional period would begin with the coming into effect of a cease-fire and end with the proclamation of the results of the referendum. Following the announcement of a cease-fire, MINURSO would verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the Territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and the Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross); implement the repatriation programme (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); identify and register qualified voters; organize and ensure a free referendum; and proclaim the results.
The plan stipulated that MINURSO would consist of the Special Representative and his office, and civilian, military and security units. The civilian component would range in size from about 800 to 1,000 personnel, depending on the requirements of the various phases of the transitional period. At full strength, the military component would consist of approximately 1,700 personnel, and the Security Unit of about 300 police officers.
ESTABLISHMENT OF MINURSO
On 29 April 1991, the Security Council, in its resolution 690 (1991), decided to establish MINURSO, in accordance with a report of the Secretary-General which further detailed the implementation plan. In approving the plan, the Security Council also accepted the timetable proposed in the Secretary-General's report. It was envisaged that the transitional period would begin no later than 16 weeks after the General Assembly approved the MINURSO budget and would last for 20 weeks. MINURSO would remain in the Territory for up to 26 weeks from the coming into effect of the cease-fire. The Secretary-General indicated, however, that the periods of time allowed for the various processes were estimates that could require adjustment.
The budget for MINURSO was approved by the General Assembly on 17 May 1991.
CEASE-FIRE
On 24 May 1991, in accordance with the plan, the Secretary-General proposed that the cease-fire should enter into effect on 6 September. Both parties accepted that date. During the following three months, however, it became clear that it would not be possible to complete before 6 September a number of tasks that were to be completed before the cease-fire. It also became clear that, notwithstanding the parties' earlier acceptance of the settlement plan, substantial areas of difference between them remained. One party therefore was not able to agree that the transition period should begin on 6 September 1991.
Meanwhile, hostilities had broken out in the Territory, interrupting an informal cease-fire that had been in effect for over two years. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General decided that the formal cease-fire should come into effect on 6 September as initially agreed, on the understanding that the transition period would begin as soon as the outstanding tasks had been completed. The Security Council supported his proposal that, during this delay, 100 military observers should be deployed in the Territory to verify the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in certain areas. The number of military observers was subsequently increased to 228 and certain logistics and administrative support staff were also sent to the field.
The primary function of MINURSO was restricted to verifying the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. This was done by direct observation of military forces and activities carried out by either party and verifying complaints of alleged cease-fire violations. United Nations military observers were deployed to ten team sites/observation posts in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. The team sites, covering the main points of concern in the Territory, were the key element in monitoring the cease-fire. United Nations military observers operated in mobile patrols. Helicopter-borne patrols were also conducted to enhance MINURSO monitoring capability and react at short notice to complaints and violations.
The headquarters of the Mission was established in the capital, Laayoune, with two regional headquarters in the northern and southern sectors of the Territory. A liaison office was also established in Tindouf to maintain contact with the Algerian authorities and the Frente POLISARIO.
DIFFERENCES REMAIN
According to the settlement plan, the referendum in Western Sahara should have taken place in January 1992. However, it was not possible to proceed in conformity with the original timetable. While both parties - the Government of Morocco and the Frente
POLISARIO - have reiterated their confidence in the United Nations, their commitment to the settlement plan and their willingness to restore the momentum of the peace process, they continue to have divergent views and different interpretations of some of the key elements contained in the plan, including those with regard to the question of criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum.
Criteria for voter eligibility were enunciated by former Secretary-General Javier P,rez de Cu,llar on 19 December 1991. While considering them to be unduly restrictive, Morocco nevertheless accepted them. For its part, the Frente POLISARIO maintained that, in the initial agreement, the two parties had agreed that the list of Saharans counted in the census conducted by the Spanish administration in the Territory in 1974 would be the exclusive basis of the electorate. In its view, the criteria of 19 December 1991 would unduly expand the electorate beyond the 1974 census list and were incompatible therefore with the relevant provisions of the settlement plan.
In the hope to break this deadlock, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Mr. Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, held, in August and September 1992, a series of separate talks with the two parties on the interpretation and application of the criteria. The purpose of such talks was to find ways of ensuring that both parties arrived at the same interpretation of the criteria.
In spite of intensive efforts by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his Special Representative to find mutually acceptable solutions, it has not so far been possible to put the implementation plan back on track. Moreover, an attempt to organize a meeting of 38 Western Saharan tribal chiefs in Geneva, at the end of November 1992, had to be cancelled because of the differences relating to the powers of some participants designated by the Moroccan party.
In his 26 January 1993 report to the Security Council on the situation in Western Sahara, the Secretary- General stated that the cancellation of the meeting in Geneva demonstrated the futility of the efforts undertaken "with vigour and resource" by his Special Representative over the preceding eight months to seek a way out of the existing deadlock. He suggested three possible options available under the circumstances.
A first option suggested the continuation and, if possible, intensification of talks. The Secretary-General believed, however, that the chances for success under this option were very slim.
A second option required the immediate implementation of the settlement plan on the basis of the instructions for the review of applications for participation in the referendum, appearing in the annex to the 19 December 1991 report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. This could mean, the Secretary- General pointed out, that the implementation would have to proceed without the cooperation of one of the parties.
A third option was to adopt an alternative approach not based on the settlement plan. Requesting guidance from the Security Council on how best to proceed, the Secretary-General stated that, depending on the Council's decision, the role and strength of MINURSO might have to be adjusted.
On 2 March, the Security Council, by its resolution 809 (1993), invited the Secretary-General to intensify efforts in order to resolve outstanding issues, and to make the necessary preparations for the referendum and to consult accordingly with the parties for the purpose of commencing voter registration starting with the updated lists of the 1974 census. The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council on the prospects and modalities for holding the referendum by the end 1993 at the latest. He was also requested to include proposals for the necessary adjustments to the role and strength of MINURSO. The Council urged the two parties to cooperate fully with the Secretary- General in implementing the settlement plan for Western Sahara and to resolve their differences regarding the criteria for voter eligibility.
On 21 May, the Secretary-General, in an interim report, informed the Council about the consultations his Special Representative had initiated with the parties on a possible compromise regarding the interpretation and application of the voter eligibility criteria, and about his decision to visit the region in the first week of June "to make one more effort to seek a compromise solution".
The Secretary-General also reported that discussions had been held with the parties on a number of issues relating to an early registration of voters. After both sides confirmed their desire to proceed promptly with the registration of voters and to cooperate with MINURSO in this regard, it was decided to establish an Identification Commission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. On 23 April 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Erik Jensen (Malaysia) as Chairman of the Commission. On 15 March 1994, the Secretary- General appointed Mr. Jensen as his Deputy Special Representative for Western Sahara, in addition to his responsibility as Chairman of the Identification Commission.
COMPROMISE PROPOSAL
The parties continued to have fundamentally divergent positions on the establishment of the electorate, one party (Morocco) wanting to make all Saharans eligible to participate in the referendum, while the other (the Frente POLISARIO) wanting to limit participation, so far as possible, to those counted in the Territory in the 1974 census, in order to avoid including those it regarded as foreign to the Territory.
During a visit to the area from 31 May to 4 June 1993, the Secretary-General presented to the parties a comprehensive text outlining a compromise solution with regard to the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility. The compromise proposal represented a practical and valid, although imperfect, basis for a preliminary selection of potential voters. The formula took due account of the fact that the applicant belonged to a Saharan tribe. It was based solely on the 1974 census which, while imperfect itself, provided the only demographic and tribal data about the Territory. Applicants would still have to meet the criteria for voter eligibility before being registered on the final electoral roll. The compromise text could not be expected to meet all the concerns of the parties or conform entirely to their views. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General believed that the interpretation of the criteria and the procedures for verification represented a compromise between conflicting positions that was even-handed and fair.
Another round of meetings was held by the Secretary-General's Special Representative from 5 to 20 June 1993. During these and subsequent consultations, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of the peace plan in its entirety and their determination to move towards an early referendum. Both sides stressed that they did not reject the proposed compromise but expressed reservations on certain provisions of the text.
In spite of its reservations, Morocco has since acquiesced in the compromise in its present form. While conveying its acceptance of all the eligibility criteria of 19 December 1991, the Frente POLISARIO expressed substantial reservations on the proposed compromise concerning their interpretation and application and requested several amendments to the text.
On 28 July 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that shortly after his visit to the area, the two parties agreed to initiate direct talks and to ask for the assistance of the United Nations in holding this meeting. The delegations of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO met from 17 to 19 July 1993 at Laayoune, in the presence of the Special Representative as United Nations observer. The Secretary- General described this event as an encouraging sign and expressed his hope that such talks would be resumed soon.
The Secretary-General also informed the Council that, in the meantime, the Chairman of the Identification Commission had travelled to the region in order to prepare for the initiation of the process of identification and registration of voters.
In the letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Security Council dated 4 August 1993, the Council fully supported efforts to make early progress on the preparations for holding the referendum in accordance with resolution 809 (1993) and welcomed the reaffirmation by the two parties of their commitment to the implementation of the settlement plan in its entirety.
SECRETARY-GENERAL REMAINS HOPEFUL
The direct talks between the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, initiated in July 1993 at Laayoune, were scheduled to resume on 25 October 1993 in New York. While ground rules laid down for the resumption of talks gave to each party the right to choose the composition of its delegation, the POLISARIO delegation "found it impossible" to meet with the other party because of the presence of former POLISARIO officials in the Moroccan delegation. Despite efforts by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to find ways of overcoming the procedural difficulties, the talks did not take place.
On 27 October, the Secretary-General issued a statement in which he deeply regretted the failure of the parties to meet. At the same time, he remained hopeful that a dialogue between the two parties "may be resumed in due course". In the meantime, the Secretary-General was determined to continue efforts for the implementation of the settlement plan and to proceed with the identification and registration of potential voters in the referendum.
REFERENDUM RESCHEDULED
On 24 November 1993, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that, in view of the remaining difficulties in the implementation of the settlement plan, it would not be possible to fulfil the goal of holding a free and fair referendum by the end of 1993. However, on the assumption that those difficulties were settled and progress made in the initial stages of the voter registration process, the Secretary-General hoped to be able to propose to the Council early in 1994 a detailed timetable for holding the referendum in mid-1994. He further proposed to maintain the existing military and civilian strength of MINURSO until his next report to the Council.
In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 6 December 1993 from the President of the Security Council, the Council agreed that the Secretary-General's compromise proposal was a sound framework for determining potential participation in the referendum in Western Sahara as foreseen in the settlement plan, and expected that any difficulties with the compromise would be resolved by early 1994. The Council also welcomed the Secretary-General's determination to move ahead and proceed with voter registration and identification.
VOTER REGISTRATION
After the Chairman of the Identification Commission had arrived in the mission area towards the end of May 1993, he assembled the members of the Commission and a team of registration officers. The former group arrived in Laayoune in June. The Chairman and his team held intensive discussions with the authorities of both parties on modalities which would enable identification and registration to proceed in a thorough and judicious manner. They also made essential arrangements for voter registration both in Western Sahara and in the Tindouf area (Algeria).
On 3 November 1993, after several rounds of discussions with both parties, the Chairman of the Commission officially announced the launching of the process leading to identification and registration. He then held a further series of discussions with both the Government of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO urging them to adhere as far as possible to the timetable agreed upon by the parties in October 1993. During these consultations, both sides confirmed their intention to proceed expeditiously with the initial stage of the registration process in cooperation with MINURSO.
In late November 1993, the revised lists of the 1974 census, together with the supplement listing the names of additional persons expected to reach 18 years of age by 31 December 1993, were made accessible in Laayoune and in the El-Aiun refugee camp in the Tindouf area. Since December 1993, application forms have been supplied and distributed, initially through centres in Laayoune and in the Tindouf area. Additional registration offices were opened in the other population centres in the Territory as well as in a few locations outside the Territory where numbers of Western Saharans were known to be living.
The Special Representative visited the mission area from 2 to 13 January 1994 for consultations with the parties and the neighbouring countries on the situation and ways of resolving the remaining difficulties. He provided assurances to allay the concerns of the Frente POLISARIO that, on the basis of the compromise, thousands of individuals foreign to the Territory might be included in the electorate. These assurances were confirmed and further elaborated in a letter dated 4 February 1994 from the Special Representative to the representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York.
OPTIONS BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL
In his 10 March 1994 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that although the preliminary registration of applicants for participation in the referendum had proceeded in Laayoune and the Tindouf area, the completion of the identification and final registration of all eligible voters remained uncertain in the absence of agreement by the Frente POLISARIO to the compromise as a whole. He further pointed out that, following protracted delays since the inception of MINURSO, every possible avenue had been explored by himself and his Special Representative to break the deadlock over the criteria and their interpretation so that the plan could be implemented. The fact that these efforts had not succeeded confronted the Security Council with a difficult choice. The Secretary-General continued by presenting three options facing the Council.
Under option A, the Council would decide that the United Nations should proceed to hold the referendum regardless of the cooperation of either party. Registration and identification of eligible voters would proceed based on the compromise, the terms of reference of the Identification Commission and the relevant provisions of the settlement plan. The transitional period would commence on 1 August 1994. The Identification Commission would analyse voter applications from March to May 1994 and would begin registration in June, at which time it would also announce the arrangements for the appeals process. By September, voter registration would be completed and the final list of voters would be published.
The United Nations would also undertake other activities called for in the original settlement plan. From 7 to 15 December 1994, the referendum would be held, the results would be proclaimed, and the withdrawal of MINURSO personnel would commence. MINURSO's monitoring responsibilities would end by 31 December 1994.
Option B, would have the Council decide that the Identification Commission should continue its work while the United Nations continued its efforts to obtain the cooperation of both parties based on the compromise proposal put forward by the Secretary-General. At the end of a prescribed period, the Council would review progress achieved and would decide on its next course of action. Until that time, the Identification Commission would be expected to complete its analysis of voter applications and begin registration of potential voters.
Under option C, the Council would conclude that the cooperation of the parties in completing the registration process could not be obtained at present and would decide either that the whole MINURSO operation should be phased out within a given time-frame or that the registration and identification process should be suspended, but that a reduced United Nations military presence should be retained in order to encourage respect for the cease-fire.
The Secretary-General noted that either option A or option B would require Member States to be willing to provide military personnel. Even maintenance of MINURSO at its present strength would require urgent action to obtain replacements for the contingents whose withdrawal had already been announced by their Governments.
On 29 March 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 907 (1994), agreed to the course of action as outlined in option B of the Secretary-General's report and requested him to report no later than 15 July 1994 on progress achieved in the Identification Commission's work as well as on other aspects of the settlement plan. It also decided that, in the event the Secretary- General reported that the referendum could not be held by the end of 1994, it would consider MINURSO's future, including an examination of options regarding its mandate and continued operations.
IDENTIFICATION AND REGISTRATION
Following the adoption of resolution 907 (1994), the Identification Commission focused its efforts on achieving the agreement and cooperation of both parties in order to proceed with the identification of potential voters. As a result, the Commission succeeded in completing all the necessary groundwork for launching the process. The identification operation was to have been launched on 8 June 1994 with the assistance of the tribal chiefs and in the presence of observers of both parties and OAU. However, it could not start as scheduled, because of Morocco's reservations over the designation of OAU observers.
As requested, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 12 July 1994. He noted the progress made towards the implementation of the settlement plan for Western Sahara and pointed to the remaining difficulties. In light of delays in the identification and registration process, the Secretary-General intended to propose that the transitional period in Western Sahara should start on 1 October 1994 and that the referendum should take place on 14 February 1995.
On 29 July 1994, the Security Council issued a statement in which it welcomed the progress made, took note of the proposed revised timetable and urged the parties to continue to cooperate with the Secretary- General and MINURSO to ensure the earliest possible implementation of the settlement plan.
As a result of the Secretary-General's extensive discussions with the leaders of OAU and other interested parties, the question of OAU observers was resolved. The identification and registration operation was finally launched on 28 August 1994, with opening ceremonies held simultaneously at Laayoune and the El- Aiun camp in the Tindouf area. At the same time, the United Nations intensified work on other political and military aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the settlement plan.
TIMETABLE TO BE REVISED
On 4 November 1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the identification and registration operation proved to be far more complex than was expected, as members of the same tribal subgroups, who must be identified individually with the assistance of their respective sheikhs, were dispersed in different locations and means of communication were limited. By the end of October, only some 4,000 potential voters from five Saharan tribal subfractions had been interviewed, equivalent to less than 2 per cent of the total number of application forms.
The Secretary-General noted that he had indicated in his 12 July 1994 report his intention to recommend that the transitional period should start on 1 October 1994 and that the referendum should take place on 14 February 1995. However, it had become clear that many months would be required to make sufficient progress in the identification process to be close to determining a date for the referendum and a revised timetable for the steps still to be taken to implement the settlement plan. The Secretary-General stated that he would report further to the Council on the organization and timing of the referendum after the consultations he intended to hold during his visit to the area in November 1994.
In the meantime, the Secretary-General decided to dispatch a technical team to the field to reassess the logistical and other requirements for the possible deployment of MINURSO at full strength.
On 15 November, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, expressed concern over the slow speed of the identification process, urged the two parties to exert all possible efforts to facilitate MINURSO's work, and urged the earliest possible deployment of the Identification Commission staff in order to accelerate the process. It welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to visit the region, and looked forward to receiving his report and the report of the technical team charged with reassessing requirements for the deployment of MINURSO at full strength. The Council strongly believed that there must be no further undue delay in the holding of a free, fair and impartial referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in accordance with the settlement plan.
The Secretary-General travelled to the region on 25-29 November 1994. During the visit, he held discussions on the question of Western Sahara with Algerian authorities in Algiers, the representatives of POLISARIO in Tindouf and Wilaya de Smara, and Moroccan authorities in Laayoune and Rabat. On the basis of those discussions, the Secretary-General was to submit a report to the Security Council.1/
COMPOSITION OF MINURSO
The foreseen full strength of MINURSO is approximately 1,700 military observers and troops, 300 police officers and 800 to 1,000 civilian personnel. The current strength of the Mission, in its limited deployment, includes 237 military observers and 48 military support personnel. Originally, the military personnel were provided by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. In October 1993, the Government of the United Kingdom withdrew its military observers. Australia withdrew its signals contingent in May 1994. Its communications duties have been taken over by military observers. The Canadian movement control was withdrawn in June 1994; it was replaced by civilian staff. In August 1994, a medical unit from the Republic of South Korea replaced the Swiss medical contingent.
MINURSO also includes 49 civilian police officers, led by the Police Commissioner, Colonel Jrgen Friedrich Reimann (Germany). Currently, their primary responsibility is to monitor local police and to ensure security and order at identification and registration sites.
On 30 November 1994, military and civilian police personnel were provided by the following countries:
COUNTRY, POLICE, TROOPS, OBSERVERS
Argentina, , , 7
Austria, 10, , 4
Bangladesh, , , 7
Belgium, , , 1
China, , , 20
Egypt, , , 9
France, , , 30
Germany, 5, ,
Ghana, , 8, 6
Greece, , , 1
Guinea, , , 1
Honduras, , , 14
Ireland, , , 9
Italy, , , 6
Kenya, , , 10
Malaysia, 15, , 15
Nigeria, 5, , 4
Norway, 5, ,
Pakistan, , , 4
Poland, , , 2
Republic of Korea, , 40, 2
Russian Federation, , , 30
Togo, 5, ,
Tunisia, , , 9
United States, , , 30
Uruguay, 4, , 15
Venezuela, , , 1
TOTAL, 49, 48, 237
Figures may vary from month to month due to rotation. "Troops" include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, etc.
In addition, some 180 international and local civilian staff members are assigned to MINURSO in support of its mandate.
FINANCIAL ASPECTS
The rough cost to the United Nations of MINURSO in 1994 was approximately $40.5 million. The operation is funded by assessed contributions of United Nations Member States. As at 30 November 1994, total contributions outstanding to the MINURSO Special Account for the period from the inception of the operation amounted to approximately $20.4 million.
1/ The Secretary-General submitted his report on 14 December 1994. He stated that his consultations with the parties indicated that, despite the difficulties encountered and the delays experienced, the political will existed to move the process forward. The Secretary-General hoped that by 31 March 1995 progress achieved in the identification and registration process would reach a level that would enable him to recommend 1 June 1995 as the date (D-day) for the start of the transitional period. In mid-August, the identification and registration of voters should be completed and the final list of voters published. The repatriation programme should be completed by the end of September. That date would coincide with the start of the referendum campaign in time to permit the referendum to take place in October 1995. Return to mark.
Note: Data effective 30 November 1994