The Peace Operations Policy Program has hosted a variety of workshops, brown bags, receptions, and conferences over the past 10 years. Selected events are presented below:

Stability Operations Army Force Estimator (SAFE)
19 January 2006

Thomas Szayna, RAND Santa Monica, visited POPP to demonstrate the Stability Operations Army Force Estimator (SAFE). RAND Arroyo Center developed the computer program to help Army planners estimate troop requirements for post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations. SAFE provides estimates of both force size and structure requirements on the basis of tasks assigned to the armed forces. The tool enables planners to integrate planning for post-conflict operations into overall campaign planning. It also allows them to come up with a quick estimate of requirements and explore the effect of different assumptions about post-conflict conditions on force requirements.

Interim Semi-static Stability Model (ISSM) and the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) Operations Other than War (OOTW) Toolbox
6 October 2005

Dean S. Hartley III presented the current state of his research and development of an OOTW tracking tool. The Interim Static Stability Model was upgraded to the Interim Semi-static Stability Model, a full scale Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) / Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (PMESII) tool. The talk served as a starting point for a more general and informal discussion of the currently available tools to support peace, humanitarian and stability operations; and the analysis of the same.

Brcko—Durable Model for Peace?
21-22 September 2005

Dr. Allison Frendak-Blume hosted a two-day conference to mark the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Accords and the 5th anniversary of the Brcko Final Award, and to address issues related to the attainment and current status of peace in Brcko. Keynote speeches were presented by POPP’s Bill Farrand, the first Supervisor of Brcko (1997-2000), and Susan R. Johnson, current Supervisor of Brcko (2004- ). The following papers were delivered:

State Department International Visitor Leadership Program Visit
29 April 2005

POPP worked with the Delphi International Program of World Learning to host a State Department International Visitor Leadership Program visit for 23 participants representing 21 different countries in late April 2005. The visitors stopped in Washington, D.C. as part of a three-week tour of US organizations under the “International Security and Global Cooperation” project. The segment at George Mason focused on the training and preparation of people who will be entering professions related to peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Amb. (ret.) John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy and Dr. Sara Cobb of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution also spoke at the event.

Brown Bag—The Illusion of the Rainbow: Comparative Evidence on Strategies for Regulating Inter-communal Conflict in Mauritius and Fiji
14 March 2005

Christian Leuprecht visited POPP to present a brown bag talk entitled “The Illusion of the Rainbow: Comparative Evidence on Strategies for Regulating Inter-communal Conflict in Mauritius and Fiji.” An assistant professor of political science at the Royal Military College of Canada, the speaker is cross-appointed to the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University where he is also a research associate at the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations in the School of Policy Studies; and a fellow of the Queen’s Centre for International Relations.
Summary: In 1994, the United Nations Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) was ratified in Barbados. The protocol sought to draw attention to the particular economic and environmental challenges faced by SIDS. In January 2005, Mauritius hosted the protocol’s 10-year review. Among the emerging themes was the extent to which economic and environmental issues are tied to political stability. Since a majority of the 39 SIDS exhibit a high degree of ethno-cultural diversity, there is now a growing realization that managing inter-communal relations is a prerequisite for achieving economic and environmental goals.
There are four basic strategies for managing ethnic difference: control, arbitration, autonomy, and consociation. Leuprecht’s research makes a case in favor of a differential approach to regulating inter-communal relations. It hypothesizes that the success of a strategy is contingent upon the context in which the strategy is deployed. To this end, the investigation has two SIDS as its dependent variables which, despite being similar in so many respects, have had very different trajectories. Although Mauritius’ prospects at independence were somber, it has turned out to be an economic and political gem. By contrast, expectations for Fiji, which had been great at independence, have been dashed by two military coups in as many years. This investigation attempts to account for these differing outcomes by “controlling” for a variety of societal and institutional factors which, for the purposes of this investigation, are taken as independent variables.

Operations Other Than War Colloquium
25 November 2002

Dean S. Hartley III discussed his work in conducting analyses of Operations Other Than War (OOTW), with a focus on the recent revision of the NATO Code of Best Practices (COBP) for analyses of Command and Control (C2) issues and the ongoing creation of an OOTW Toolbox by the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO). The COBP revision was the result of a three-year project to include the problems raised by OOTWs in C2 analyses. The goal of the OOTW Toolbox project was to create a set of tools useful in a variety of circumstances, including forward deployment, for the analysis of OOTW problems.

POPP Honors Faculty Authors
29 April 2002
POPP hosted a reception honoring faculty authors who published with the Canadian Peacekeeping Press:

American Civilian Police and International Police Operations: What Have We Learned and Is There More We Should Do?
13-15 March 2001

POPP and the United States Institute of Peace hosted a symposium that brought together US civilian police (CIVPOL) officers, government and intergovernmental officials, and other experts to detail lessons learned from Americans’ participation in past policing missions and distinguish concrete recommendations for improving US capabilities in the future. Four themes framed the event:

Religious Considerations of Peace Operations: The Role of the Military Chaplain
27-28 April 1999

Dr. Ivan L. King organized a two-day workshop to explore how military chaplains might be involved in peace support operations, disaster relief, and other peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Approximately 45 chaplains participated by delineating their role and experiences in recent operations. The workshop revealed that chaplains’ roles had greatly expanded, but were not buttressed by military policy, doctrine, or training. This resulted in uncertainty regarding the following:

Refugee Modeling Workshop
9 October 1997

POPP and Mr. Dayton Maxwell (World Vision International) gathered together participants to examine questions surrounding refugee repatriation, rehabilitation, and reconciliation; and the advisability of modeling refugee processes for subsequent practical application. Participants indicated: “Political will is difficult to model—both from external and the refugees themselves.” “What if they don’t want to go home?” “We need to know who owns the problem.” “We need to connect the cause but avoid the question of conflict resolution.” “We are not dealing with quantifiables and data should be quantifiable.” “The model should offer options and possible solutions.” “What has not come out is what the refugees say—their input has not been taken into account.” “What are the issues and factors to be considered?” “We need to involve the development agencies from the early stage of relief.”

The Bosnia Force Options Review Panel
12 September 1997

POPP and the Council for a Livable World Education Fund presented a panel discussion on various force options that might be employed in Bosnia should American troops participating in NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) be redeployed in June 1998. A Zero Force (ZFOR), Transition Force (TFOR), United Nations Force (UNFOR), and Peace Force (PFOR) were considered in light of different measures:

Brcko: Can a Solution be Found?
21 March 1997

POPP partnered with World Vision International and Mercy Corps International to put on a round table for US official, Bill Farrand, who had just been named international supervisor of Brcko. CMPO 1.0 was presented as a framework for basing an intervention design. Farrand was charged with supervising the return of refugees, opening highway and river traffic, creating the foundation for elections, setting up a multi-ethnic police force, enforcing freedom of movement, and jumpstarting the economy. Participants indicated: “You need to consider both micro and macro perspectives and how political will affects process—can’t do micro and macro only, need to do both.” “Political will is US will—there is no ‘international’ will.” “It is up to the American administration to move or not.” “Brcko is a test case for the Republika Srpska—it is to be treated as an international city.” “The test of international commitment revolves around arresting known war criminals in high political positions. Then the idea of justice can begin to permeate and demonstrates that backers of peace are willing to take a risk for peace. Justice is always symbolic, and we need to move away from the concept of absolute justice.” “Leaders are willing to listen to ‘welfare of the people’ arguments—it directly reflects their own interests and the interests of their people.” “If you have Brcko as the focus you have many foci—need to expand from just one community to other communities, and up to regional and other vertical levels.” “Brcko and Mostar are two case studies that people watch—if nothing happens there, no one expects anything to happen in other cities in similar situations.”

The Future of Peacekeeping Efforts in Liberia
19 August 1996

POPP assembled a group of expatriate Liberians representing all the factions involved in the fighting and a broad range of the civil populace, along with representatives of the US Government, nongovernmental organizations, and others interested in the long-running Liberian crisis to discuss the future of peacekeeping efforts in the country. Despite their differences, the Liberians were in agreement on a number of points:

Peacekeeping Round Table III: Diplomatic Initiatives for Peacekeeping
29 November 1995

POPP conducted a seminar to distinguish diplomatic aspects of peacekeeping operations. The panelists, Mr. Michael Arietti (State Department, Director of Peacekeeping), Ambassador Emilio J. Cardenas (Argentine Ambassador to the UN Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations), Ambassador Allen Holmes (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Low Intensity Conflict), Ambassador Dennis McLean (Simmons College), Colonel Angel Moreno (UN Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations), Colonel Peter Leentjes (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Training), and Mr. Cedric Thornberry (Former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of UNPROFOR), were asked to provide their thoughts on the topic. They were then presented with hypothetical scenarios based in the Great Lakes, South America, and Central Asia and asked to respond with proposed actions or requests for clarification.

Peacekeeping Round Table II: Humanitarian Options
19 July 1995

This second of three round tables sought to examine humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping, recognizing that trying to assist civilians caught up in violent conflict is what very often brings about international involvement. Dave Davis (POPP), Mr. Mark Walsh (US Army Peacekeeping Institute), and Mr. Andrew Natsios (World Vision) headed up three panels. The first looked at operations and tasks to identify what really needs to be performed on the ground. The second dealt with coordination during operations. The third concentrated on logistical and financial support.

Peacekeeping Round Table I: Military Paradigms of Peacekeeping
19 April 1995

POPP held a round table to identify military aspects of peacekeeping operations.

Organizing the Community of Nations for Peace Operations
30 August 1994

Articulating the precise goal of a peace operation before it is mounted is a proper, important, but sometimes unachievable task. Entry and exit criteria are linked to this procedure, but may evolve, and in some cases may never be uniformly understood or embraced by all the participants in an operation. Command and control capabilities will be both influenced by, and an influence upon, the nature of the intervention. Humanitarian, political, and military organizations have separate roles to play which require coordination at every level. Because the military contingent controls extensive resources that can be destructive and/or constructive, its mission must be carefully determined to ensure it furthers the ultimate political goal. Unfortunately, this brings one full circle as the political goal may not always be fully formed. Yet the perceived need to act in the face of situations that challenge international stability and bring suffering and death to millions bears upon us whether or not we can agree upon a formula for shaping international interventions. This third of three round tables (initiated in December 1993) posited that the organizational question could be decomposed into three requirements:

Peace Keeping Command & Control Knowledge Engineering Session: An Intervention Decision Model
6 April 1994

Political and military leaders responsible for “keeping the peace” internationally face a seemingly impossible challenge: Decisions are made in an environment that is filled with competing objectives, constrained resources, and significant uncertainty regarding the consequences of any course of action that might be pursued. Our “information rich” society overwhelms decision makers with data of varying degrees of importance, accuracy, and reliability. The objective of this session was to distinguish those key values and uncertainties that impact any intervention decision to develop a “scenario independent” decision support system.

Entrance and Exit Criteria—How Developed and How Assessed?
5 April 1994

Four panels comprised of distinguished individuals from the Departments of State and Defense, academia, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments participated in this second of three round tables (initiated in December 1993) and asked: How do we determine the benefits of getting involved in peace operations? When should these operations change form? How should they be terminated? It was determined that entrance and exit criteria must be developed well prior to the commitment of troops or other resources. Difficulties in doing so are caused by the political nature of the questions, and the lack of clear pathways for moving forward. Discussants believed the information to develop criteria usually were available, but not necessarily to the decision maker, causing them to act as if working in an information-sparse environment. This perception regarding “lack of information” tended to encourage fully subjective and politically motivated decision processes. Clarity of purpose and criteria also emerged as a central theme, with several proposals offered to mitigate the problem. Finally, the role of nongovernmental actors and humanitarian action formed a large part of the conversation with the major point: “Humanitarian action is not and should not be an instrument of policy. It should be respected in terms of its essential nature to respect and protect human life. The implementation of humanitarianism is obviously a political act. Humanitarian action and humanitarian intervention has been used by warring parties to advance their own interests.”

Policy Implications of Command and Control in Multinational Peace Support Operations
10 December 1993

This first of three round tables sponsored by The Institute of Public Policy (TIPP), US Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), and US Army Model Improvement and Study Management Agency (MISMA) was conducted to investigate the relationship between command and control (C2) and international peace operation mission accomplishment, working under the assumption that C2 requirements have a reflexive influence on policy making. Participants include senior representatives from US government agencies and the military services. C2 was not considered in the narrow sense of mechanisms for issuing orders and receiving feedback, but more broadly, including the interface among political, military, and humanitarian activities; and among strategic, operational, and tactical choices. The discussion centered around five topics:

Command and Control Domain Model Workshop
29 April 1993

Robert Might and Dave Davis (The Center of Excellence in Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) conducted a workshop to preview a “Command and Control Domain Model” created by GMU and GTE Federal Systems Division under DARPA’s Domain Specific Software Architecture (DSSA) program. Participants were asked to assist in validating the model by commenting on the relationship between command and control (C2) and international peace operation mission accomplishment, working under the assumption that C2 requirements have a reflexive influence on policy making.