POPP originally began its work in January 1994 as a research unit on George Mason University’s Fairfax campus. Over the past 10 years we have performed contract work sponsored by a variety of US and international organizations. The following are our most significant endeavors:

Modeling and Simulation Support for Crisis Response Operations
October 2004-July 2005

POPP was awarded a contract from the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to join a NATO Modeling and Simulation Working Group (MSWG) and take its Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) to investigate the types of tasks accomplished by civilian and military actors in 13 post-Cold War peace operations. Literature and after-action reviews were collected and coded for the presence, duration, level of occurrence (strategic, operational, or tactical), and importance of 500 CMPO tasks. POPP presented its findings in Paris during July 2005.

The initial results of the study took the form of two tables of tasks. For instance, the top 20 tactical-level tasks that emerged from the data are presented in Table 1, and top 20 operational level tasks in Table 2 (below).

Table 1. Top 20 Selected Tactical Tasks

Table 2. Top 20 Selected Operational Tasks

However, simply listing tasks that need to be represented in the models and simulations used by the US military to train its forces, prepare for operations, and to decide the most efficient approaches to stability operations was deemed insufficient. JFCOM and the MSWG asked that POPP determine what tasks were actually taking place in operations versus those currently represented in training models and simulations. Training models, individual or federated, must establish the appropriate environment for the training audience and be able to replicate the tasks operators may be expected to execute. POPP recommended that the task tables be considered by model proponents for inclusion and that additional research be conducted.

Assessment of the Effectiveness of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs in West Africa
July 2004-December 2004

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University requested that POPP perform an assessment of the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau with an eye toward future efforts in Côte d’Ivoire. Cessation of hostilities, maintenance of a safe and secure environment, the willingness or ability to fulfill obligations, strategic clarity (DD&R peace agreement language) + tactical flexibility (DD&R implementation), and the need for a solid political and institutional base for DD&R served to structure the recommendations. Regarding specific program implementation, past experiences demonstrated that a coordinated effort in sensitizing the public and ex-fighters to the DD&R process was needed. The period of encampment should not be overly long (about a week), and the former combatants required food and water, civilian clothing, medical attention, and information regarding the entire process and what to expect when discharged, while staying in adequate living quarters. There should be enough personnel to manage disarmament/ demobilization centers, and plenty of supplies for registering individuals and providing identification cards or receipts upon surrender of weapons/arms or discharge. There must be safe collection, storage, and destruction of weapons/arms. The GTZ experience in Sierra Leone demonstrated that public displays of demolition served as a powerful confidence-builder at the community level. Programs for conversion to agricultural tools were also useful.

Given the relative lack of maturity of the three cases, not much could be offered in the way of reintegration experiences and their application to Côte d’Ivoire other than the need to direct monies for this phase; and perhaps even more, to target community-based approaches that would improve the overall economic situation of the receiving population.

Stabilization Force Historical Archive Review
June 2003-September 2003

Dave Davis was retained by the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) to evaluate the Stabilization Force (SFOR) Historian’s archive. The categorization scheme and accessibility and completeness of the archive were analyzed. Additionally, an expanded treatment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was undertaken and study guide attempted to detail lessons learned in patrolling of urban areas, rural areas, and zones of separation, cross validated with findings from KFOR’s experience in Pristina.

The Conceptual Model of Counterterrorist Operations (CMCTO)
February 2003—October 2003

POPP has much experience with conceptual modeling, having performed this work in the domain of peace operations since the early 1990s. Recognizing that most experts in the field tend to focus on the concept of terrorism, in particular—How does one define terrorism? How does an individual become a terrorist?—the National Defense University wished to see if POPP could bring its conceptual modeling experience to bear in detailing operations seeking to counter terrorism.

The three highest-order functions emerged as:

Dr. Ted Woodcock transitioned the CMCTO into a Systems Dynamics Model of Counterterrorist Operations.

See Research – CMCTO for information pertaining to the model.

Senior Management Analysis Seminars in Peace Operations
October 2001–September 2002

Senior staff members at UN and non-UN peace missions have commented on their need to learn many important processes on the job. Most are management related, and possibly unique to the field of peace operations. The complexity of UN systems, (at times) chaotic international interagency environment, and sensitivity and fragility of conflict and immediately post-conflict civil societies place immense burdens on intervention staff. This contract reviewed the requirements for designing a recurring “Senior Management Analysis Seminar” to begin to address these issues.

Mission Task Analysis for Peacekeeping, Conflict Prevention, and Extraction
October 2001–January 2002

The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) retained POPP to decompose peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and extraction missions into political/military mission descriptions, mission essential components (MEC), operational objectives and specifications (OOS), phases of the operation, key tasks, and specifications.

Peacekeeping

• Situation: The UN has requested that NATO lead a peace support operation (PSO) to uphold an agreement that ends an internal conflict (possibly with external intervention involved). Consent of the principal belligerents is present, but some dissidents with limited military capability remain and could disrupt the peace process. The agreement includes restrictions on heavy weapons and the withdrawal of external belligerent forces.
• Mandate: The force is to uphold the peace agreement and provide sufficient security within the region to allow political, diplomatic, and reconstruction activities to create a lasting peace. This includes: a) providing a secure environment for civil restoration, b) separation of belligerents, c) deterring a resumption of hostilities, d) assuring the continued and uninterrupted provision of essential services and protection of strategic national assets, and e) assisting in the protection of civilian agencies in restoring the economic infrastructure and provision of aid.

Conflict Prevention

• Situation: An existing crisis threatens to spill over into a peaceful country. Cross-border fire has occurred and refugees have flooded into the peaceful country from the conflict area. The peaceful nation is currently unable to cope with the situation. The nation and UN have requested that NATO assist in the containment of the crisis and support the humanitarian effort associated with the refugees.
• Mandate: The force is to deter and contain the conflict from spreading to the peaceful country, plus a) support diplomatic and political activities to stabilize the region, and b) support humanitarian aid activities in stabilizing the refugee situation.

Extraction

• Situation: The UN has requested that NATO assist in the withdrawal of a UN peacekeeping force which had been deployed to uphold a peace agreement within a country. In the subsequent deterioration of the agreement, the belligerents have resorted to the use of force. Consequently, the lightly armed UN peacekeeping force is at a significant disadvantage. The UN has called on the belligerents not to interfere with the withdrawal, but no consent has been given. The withdrawal is to include UN personnel, and personnel from other associated agencies should they wish to leave.
• Mandate: The force is to secure the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force, UN personnel, and personnel from other associated agencies should they wish to leave. The mission includes providing humanitarian support on a case-by-case basis without detracting from the mission or endangering the security and safety of NATO or UN forces. Such support shall be provided for civilians working with, or in support of, the UN in cases where there is a clear threat to human life and if such support would facilitate the conduct of the mission. The force is to avoid favoring any particular belligerent group.

Prototype Complex Humanitarian Emergencies/Peace Operations Support Tool
August 2001–June 2002

Several years ago US Pacific Command was involved in an Australian-US initiative in operations research support for peace operations. The tool being developed under this initiative came to be known as the “Peace Operations Support Tool” (POST). Envisioned as a web-based planning, collaboration, and mission execution tool set to enhance interoperability during operations other than war, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and evacuating noncombatants, the first prototype was oriented towards functions expected to be exercised during Cobra Gold 02, a Thai/US/Singaporean exercise conducted in May 2002.

POPP staff critically re-evaluated its early version of CMPO under this contract, notably decoupling actors from functions and tasks. CMPO 5.0 was delivered in February 2002. It contained 282 functions, 163 of which were selected for incorporation into POST. Over 2,300 tasks were extracted from CMPO (394), AUSA-RAMP (158), NATO (345), PDD-56/IDA (1,314), and Pol-Mil Plan (130) lists and rationalized into 2,020 tasks. One hundred and seventy seven organizations were then linked to the tasks.

Community Outreach and Team-Building Program
January 2001–September 2001

POPP teamed with the University of the District of Columbia’s (UDC) Cooperative Extension Services (CES) department to conduct a community outreach and team-building program. S.E.N.S.E.TM (Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates), an economic simulation developed by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), was utilized to provide:

• Team-building and economic development education to faculty members and students of UDC;
• A complex environment within which professionals in the Washington, DC area could experience multiethnic decision making in a goal-oriented economic context; and
• An exercise in which participants could experience the cultural sensitivities of diverse ethnic groups in a competitive environment.

The program further involved human simulation—including role-playing, interpersonal negotiations, and a series of seminar/trainings interspersed with the computer simulation—and was very well received. Seventy-six individuals, either residing or working in the District of Columbia, participated in programs held between May and August. Close to 95 percent reported the simulation and seminar program helped them to better understand the complex nature of decision making in a political-economic environment. This included clarity with respect to their own interests, an increased ability to express those interests, a willingness to listen to other parties’ interests, and a willingness to negotiate differences. Additionally, throughout the sessions, individuals reported positive feelings toward the team building generated by the simulation—whether small group (such as two people working at one computer terminal functioning as a commercial firm), medium group (such as eight people working together as the government of the fictitious country represented by the computer software), or large group (such as the entire game cohort working to see the fictitious country get back on its feet and then prosper).

Developing Models and Simulations for Peace Support Operations
June 2000-October 2000

The Institute for Technology of Intelligent Systems, Bundeswehr University, Munich requested that POPP research the present state of development of models and simulations for peace support operations (PSOs). It was argued that a PSO is primarily a diplomatic and humanitarian action in which the military has a supporting function—fundamentally different from the one it performs in conventional warfare. Second, effective models and simulations must address the unique character and complexity of this kind of operation, including, but not limited to, its military component. Thus, modifications of existing military models and simulations were considered not able to meet existing needs. The research identified process drivers that must inform new modeling and simulation strategies, labeled “People” (indigenous persons, parties to the conflict, former combatants, and war criminals), “Crisis Environment” (humanitarian issues, government, and economy), and “Security Functions” (civilian safety, military agenda, and military operations). Several promising techniques that warrant continued development were further explored.

Task Analysis: Functional Requirements for Peace Operations Training Systems
June 2000-October 2000

Determining the functional requirements to be included in computer-assisted training simulations, or for that matter all simulations, has been around since the initial development of military computer simulations in the early 1940s. Today, as we attempt to build simulations and computer models to assist in the training for the missions included in peace operations, we are even more at a disadvantage. Not only is there a question of inclusion in a computer simulation, but there is a lack of knowledge on the theory behind the processes being simulated. We know more now about peace operations since Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, however have we clearly developed a theory to encompass all of the necessary processes, functions, and tasks that are required? POPP’s Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) was developed in the 1990s to depict these requirements. It was a logical extension to ask whether or not the tasks that were included in CMPO could be analyzed to provide an initial prioritization for functional inclusion in a simulation. It was hoped that this analysis would provide some indication of the risk of under-representation of certain processes that might otherwise not be included in a training simulation.

A table of 60 tasks was created listing the initial recommended minimal task list for simulation and training with a balanced model. “Likelihood” represents the existence of a task within a mission, not its relative frequency of occurrence in a particular mission or importance to mission success. These two caveats should indicate that a great deal of secondary and subjective analysis is needed before a definitive list of requirements is agreed to for a simulation or model.

Recommended Minimal Task List (Functional Order) Top Nine

Restructuring and Harmonization of PSO Task Lists: For Defense and Operational Training
November 1999-June 2000

In the late 1990s the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) made noteworthy accomplishments in the area of analysis of peace support operations (PSO), in particular analysis of required tasks with historical validation and theoretical verification. Most of the tasks have accompanying rules that help determine requirements for the numbers and types of organizations, labeled “troop-to-task” rules (TTR).

NC3A requested that POPP analyze task work that remained to be done, including the consolidation and harmonization of several existing task lists—the Ground, Air, and Maritime lists used in PSO force structure planning, the lists used in the Force Identification Systems (FIDS) support to operational planning, and the Force Oriented Tasks (FOT). It was thought that continued development of the analytic methodology required that the differences in structure and application of these sets of tasks be minimized, or eliminated if possible.

Figure 1: Mission to Task Method


Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates (S.E.N.S.E.) Support
November 1998-December 1999

POPP came under contract with the Institute for Defense Analyses to support development of a computer simulation—S.E.N.S.E.—modeling a country which recently emerged from civil war. S.E.N.S.E. allows decision makers to experience post-conflict reconstruction through its virtual economic-political-military-social interface. Participants engage in collaborative discourse and information exchange, plus implement policies that are collectively experienced. The fictitious host country, Akrona, is represented by public and private sectors. Bilateral partners, UN agencies, The World Bank, and a transnational corporation embody the international community. POPP faculty provided subject matter expertise for the project and George Mason University students functioned as tutor-coaches.

Multinational Curriculum on Peace Operations
September 1998-August 1999

With funding from the Ford Foundation POPP developed a flexible curriculum for teaching peace operations. Addressing 15 separate topic areas, it can be adapted as needed to constitute a traditional one-semester long academic course or a shorter, more intensive seminar. In addition, each topic area can be expanded into a comprehensive treatment of the particular subject. The curriculum draws on both the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) and experience from the field.

Security Concept for Sierra Leone
August 1998-April 1999

POPP collaborated with USAID and World Vision International to provide policy-level design support for an effort by the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL), Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and the Commonwealth to restructure, retrain, and recreate an Army in Sierra Leone; GOSL, UN, the Commonwealth, and others to restructure, retrain, and recreate the police in Sierra Leone, and GOSL, US Agency for International Development, and others to redefine and regularize the Civil Defense Forces in Sierra Leone. The product was a draft two-year schedule of first studying the results of recent experiences, then holding community sessions with paramount chiefs to review the results and recommendations, followed by developing draft legislation using a critical path model. The composition of the new army was reviewed with a decision theoretic tool and the results charted by relative preference among “no army,” “reconstitute old army,” and “create new army” choices. Renewed conflict halted the effort.

Information Campaigns for Peace Operations
May 1998-December 1998

The National Defense University retained POPP to research the principles of an information campaign in a peace operation and how they should be measured; and possibilities of coordinating and collaborating across all intervenors in the operation. An in-depth literature review was performed. POPP staff then conducted on-site observations of information-based efforts in support of Haiti elections and compared them to the media and information campaign operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results of the study were published in a book entitled Information Campaigns for Peace Operations.

NATO C3 Agency’s Workshop on Limited Conflict
October 1997-February 1998

POPP collaborated with the NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency’s (NC3A) Operations Research Division to develop and host a workshop on the “Conduct of Limited Conflict,” 3-5 December 1997. The aim of the workshop was to address the nature of limited conflict and analyze the perspectives of warring parties to shed light on the behavior of factions in the pre-hostilities phase; and enable planners to identify critical indicators signaling both the intent to escalate to violent conflict, as well as the most likely course of action they will adopt to achieve their objectives. The intended end product of the workshop was a preliminary analytical framework for limited conflict based on the findings of the discussions. A framework emerged and is the subject of further research.

The framework takes two views of the conflict: a) a conflict-oriented view that seeks to highlight sources, parties, interests and pursuits; and b) a power/persuasion-oriented approach which seeks to understand the geography, economy, politics, military, media and popular resolve of those impacted by the conflict. These two views can be seen as separate entries into the matrix of analysis as shown in the table below.

The Analysis Matrix

In the case of limited conflict, this analysis is ultimately of use in two separate, but reinforcing, domains. The first is the attempt of the analyst to understand the internal dynamics of the conflict; and second is to determine what might be the most appropriate type of response to the conflict. One begins the analysis by attempting to fill in the cells of the matrix with known, or surmised, information. For example, looking only at the sources column of the matrix, we can look at the geographic and/or economic sources of the current conflict. Each of these tables represents the potential uses of the elements of power in describing or supporting the elements. It was hypothesized that by a careful and exhaustive description of these cross-elements connections, an understanding of the conflict would emerge. It was further hypothesized that increasing the understanding of the conflict would greatly inform the development of plans for the transformation of the conflict from a violent and destructive one, to a peaceful movement to maturity.

Troops-to-Task: Refinement and Enhancement of NC3A Peace Support Operations Methodology for Determining Peace Support Operations Force Requirements
September 1997-January 1998

For several years NATO engaged in building a methodology to support its force structure effort in peace support operations (PSO). Under this contract POPP was tasked to enhance and refine NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency’s (NC3A) PSO methodology for determining force requirements, particularly as it addressed the review and development of allocation rules associated with determining how many troops are needed to accomplish a specific task. This work only dealt with the rules associated with land forces.

Forty-seven “troop-to-task” rules (TTR) for land forces were reviewed against the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations, Mission Analysis Tool for Peace Operations, and NATO force structure methodology, resulting in modification of 23 task names and/or rules. In addition, 10 proposed tasks with rules were merged into the structure:

New Tasks

A matrix was created to provide a visual picture of which units NC3A and POPP felt could accomplish each of the given tasks. Lastly, new rules were developed for the proposed tasks and their use in peace enforcement and/or peacekeeping environments.

Liberian Elections—Facilitated Problem Solving
January 1997

POPP and World Vision International conducted a facilitated problem-solving workshop in Monrovia to provide assistance to the Liberian people in anticipation of May 1997 elections. The elections portion of the Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO) was utilized as a framework for discussion, planning, and development of initial tasks to move the process forward. Questions of concurrent work versus sequential activity were addressed, as were questions about prerequisites for the conduct of specific tasks. For example, the date of the voting in the initial critical path model was later in the year than called for by the Abuja Accords. The participants were able to identify tasks and durations that could be adjusted to move the voting to a more desirable date. This movement was conducted within the full view and participation of all members of the workshop, thereby understanding the assumptions that were being made and contributing to the overall transparency of the process. An in-country support team was arranged to assist with implementation of the findings.

The Conceptual Model of Peace Operations (CMPO)
February 1996-September 1996

POPP developed Version 1.0 of the CMPO under contract to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. CMPO was envisioned as a top-down decomposition of the domain of peace operations, distinguished as an impartial intervention for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. Webster’s definition of peace—a state of security or order within a community provided for by law or custom—was operationalized as the concurrent state of order and justice:

• Order: a sociopolitical system; and
• Justice: a) the quality of being just, impartial, or fair; b(1) the principle or ideal of just dealing or right action, (2) conformity to this principle or ideal: righteousness; and c) the quality of conforming to law.
  

Historical experience demonstrates that during an intervention the order component is determined by the intervenor, yet the justice component is measured by the people involved in the conflict.

Peace Making, Peace Building, and Peace Support comprise CMPO’s highest level functions and interact with the parties to the conflict, the environment of the conflict, and with each other.

Peace Making is where the parties to the conflict are brought together and agreements are made. Its sub-functions include “Diplomatic Fact Finding and Decision Making,” “Negotiation and Mediation,” “Award and Enforcement Actions,” and “Information Activity.” Peace Building is the primary process for bringing more justice to a needy situation. Justice is not considered independent of order. Peace Building sub-functions consist of “Maintaining Human Rights,” “Providing Humanitarian Relief and Development,” “Providing for Refugees and Internally Displaced Populations,” “Maintaining or Improving Self Governance and Institution Building,” “Advancing Economic Principles and Overall Fiscal Well Being,” “Maintaining or Creating a Suitable Infrastructure (both physical and virtual),” and “Providing for the Demobilization, Demilitarization and Reintegration of combatants.” Finally, Peace Support sub-functions bring order to a more chaotic situation: “Observation,” “Command and Control,” “Use of Force,” “Liaison,” “Logistics,” “Presence,” and “Security.”

See Research – CMPO for information pertaining to the most recent version of the model.

The Policy Implications of Command and Control in Multinational Peace Support Operations
November 1993–August 1994

Wolf-Dietrich Kutter (CALIBRE Systems) and Dave Davis received funding from the Army War College to research policy implications of command and control for multinational peace support operations. A series of three round tables were held at GMU: Policy Implications of Command and Control in Multinational Peace Support Operations (10 December 1993), Entrance and Exit Criteria—How Developed and How Assessed? (5 April 1994), and Organizing the Community of Nations for Peace Operations (30 August 1994). A second series of round tables was recommended to study the various national cultures of peacekeeping, both military and humanitarian; and development of a model to represent a peace operation.